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TOWARDS ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE IN WAMZ:
. EFFECTS OF FISCAL DOMINANCE ON
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
-0. J. NNANNA (Ph. D).

Abstract

This article discusses the threat posed by.fl.seal dominance and measures
that could be adopted to contain it in order to foster macroeconomic
convergence in the WAMZ. The presentation is organised around two
elements: the boom and burst cycle of capital expenditure, adjudged to be
the root cause of fiscal dominance, and an empirical analysis of the
implication offiscal dominancefor macroeconomic stability in the WAMZ.
While the empirical and anecdotal evidences ofthe adverse effect ojjiscal
dominance is overwhelming, the paper went.fitrther to propose a.fiscal rule
that would contain the destabilising effect oflarge revenue swings.
1.

Overview

Effort to create a second monetary zone and a free trade area has
gathered momentum since the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ)
protocol was signed in 199 l . The WAMZ project is predicated on the
proposition that economic integration can indeed, enhance the prosperity
and welfare of the citizens of the member states. First, it would facilitate the
pooling of risks between otherwise vulnerable economies, and enable the
region exploit complementarities and attract the levels of investment
required for the development of modern industries, enjoy more
specialisation, economies of scale and better access to technological
' The author is the Director of Research at the Central Bank of Nigeria. The views expressed in this paper
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the organisation with which he is
affiliated. He gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Mr. E. A. Essien in the preparation of this
paper.
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spillovers (Essien and Egbuna, 2002). Second, the monetary union would
encourage the mobilisation and improved manageme~t of hum an and
financial resources (Ojo, 2001 ). Third, the formation of the monetary union
would help hasten the process of macroeconomic stability, ensure :;trict
budget discipline via peer group pressure, sustain exchange rate and price
stability, and promote better growth performance (Nnanna, 2000).
The WAMZ convergence criteria are divided into four primary and
six secondary criteria, with various targets and dates set for the different
criteria. Under the "Convergence, Stability, Growth and Solidarity Pact"
adopted by the member countries, all WAMZ --:1ember countries are
required to fully meetthe criteria at tl~e stipulated dates.
The primary criteria, which is central to this paper consis~ of four pillars:
*

*

*

*

Inflation: Under the treaty, member countries are expected to achieve
single digit inflation by end-2002 and specifically, 5 per cent by end2003.
Overall Budget Def icit: A restriction of the overall budget deficit as a
ratio of the gross domestic product of not more than 3 per cent. This is
a key pillar aimed at gauging govemn1ent commitment to fiscal
prudence.
Central Bank Financing of Deficit: In order to ensure sustained fi scal
prudence, a ceiling was placed on the financin° of fiscal deficit at 10
per cent of previous year's tax revenue.
Foreign Exchange Reserves: The stock of foreign exchange reserves
that is capable cf financing 6 months of imports by 2003.

While recognising that the harmonisation and conve1 5ence of
policies is a precondition, compliance is even more crucial . Empirical
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evaluation of compliance suggests that member countries have not made
sufficient effort to meet the macroeconomic convergence criteria. From
Nigeria to Sierra Leone, the story is the same. According to Nnanna (2002),
large swings have characterised the macroeconomic performance of the
WAMB countries. Policies in member states have been implemented in fits
and starts and in ways that have sustained divergence rather than
convergence. The result is that few member countries have met som~, but
not all of the criteria. While some countries have achieved a single digit
inflation rate and the prescribed target of external reserves, fiscal deficit has
posed the greatest challenge to convergence. Fiscal dominance has
therefore been recognised as a major clog in the wheel of convergence.
Indeed, a gr0wing body of evidence, both anecdotal and empirical suggests
that macroeconomic stability in the sub-regi~n is undermined by fiscal
dominance.
Simply put, fiscal dominance is a term used to express a situation
where the conduct of monetary policy is dominated by fiscal shocks. Fiscal
dominance has two key elements. These are: the size of the deficit and the
mode of financing the deficit. According to fischer and Easterly ( 1990), the
size highlights the effects of deficit on domestic saving and investment, the
current account ai1d the links between the budget deficit and the ultimate
goal of monetary pol icy. The mode brings to light the different kinds of
distortions the deficit can cause, namely: excess liquidity, which causes
demand-pull inflation, foreign exchange demand pressure, which leads to
balance of payment crisis and exchange rate depreciation, external debt
overhang, which includes high real interest rates and crowding out of the
private investment.
While the world economic depression of the l 930's led to the
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thinking that there was need for government intervention, the keynesian
rt?volution popularized deficit financing. Keynes encouraged the resort to
deficit financing in order to jump-start an economy in a state of depression .
Empirical studies have provided some evidence to support the KeY,nesian
view of the role of government, although the jury is not yet out. However,
evidence from the WAMZ countries, arising from the prevalence of
unsustainable deficits has gjven the indication that also supports the fact that
Keynes prescription has been misused. This is because Keynes prescription
did not suggest that government should finance the deficit by printing
money, a situation that has induced the macroeconomic imbalance observed
intheWAMZ.
Despite the overwhelming empirical and anecdotal evidence on the
adverse consequence of fiscal dominance, it has remained attractive in all
WAMZ countries. This paper therefore focuses on the macroeconomic
effects and consequences of inflationary financing . Following this
overview, the next section discusses the ' Boom and Burst' cycle of capital
expenditure in the WAMZ, with particular reference to Nigeria. In section
III, an empirical analysis of the impact of fiscal deficit on key
macroeconomic variables is can-ied out. The need for fiscal adjustment
forms the focus of section IV, while section V concludes the paper.
2.

The Boom and Burst Cycle of Capital Spending in the WAMZ:
The Nigeria Case Study and Lesson Learned.

The term boom and burst have been used to describe the severity or
the procyclicality of revenue and expenditure over time. A boom therefore is
the top or peak of the cycle, when there is a big jump in revenue, which is
accompanied by expenditure. When economic performance begins to

5
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decline from that peak there is a downturn and if it persists, at least
theoretically, for more than two quarters, a recession is said to set in . A large
recession is called a depression and burst means that the economy is in a
depression . In this paper, the same terminology is used to describe the cycle
of capital expenditure in the WAMZ, including Nigeria.
Historical antecedents indicate that the boom for WAMZ countries
began with the sudden rise in the prices of oil and other prim ary export
commodities in the early I970 's . As with all resource-based economies,
such as those dependent on primary commodities (oil in Nigeria, cocoa in
Ghana, diamond in Liberia and SieITa Leone, etc), revenue is uncertain and
highly volatile because the prices of these commodities are uncertain . Thus,
a positive (negative) terms of trade shock resulting from a rise (fall) in prices
is capable of exerting considerable positive (negative) impact on capital
expenditure, resulting in a boom (burst). Figures la and b are graphs
depicting trends in revenue-to-GDP and capital expenditure-to-GDP ratios
for Ghana and Nigeria~. The gr aphs show that capital expenditure has been
moving in sympathy with commodity revenue.
45.0

Fig. 1a
Ghana's Capital Expendtture and Cocoa revenue {% of GDP)
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As a result of data constrain the graph for other WAMZ countries could not be shown.
Data for Ghana was obtained from International Financial Statistics of the IMF.
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The case of Nigeria is very instructive. Capital expenditure grew by
over I 000 per cent between 1970 and 1975, largely owing to the need to
finance post war reconstiuction and the oi l price hike of l 973 , which
resulted in a sharp rise in government revenue. The upward trends in
revenue and capital expenditure persisted until 1978. With the drop in the oi l
revenue in the early I980's, which eclipsed the investment potential s of the
boom of the 1970s, a larger current deficit was created as imports continued
to grow faster than exports. However, the period of boom was quickly
followed by a burst, from 1980 until l 984 following the adverse terms of
trade shock . During this period, the growth in capital spending was dismal,
and substantial budget deficits were recorded.
Following the economic crisis, most capital projects were abandoned
and an urgent federal action was required. Thus in 1983, the government
embarked upon an ' austerity' programme. The austerity policy brought
severe hardship to the populace, and undermined good governance and
distributional equity. Ultimately, it provided the alibi for a military
intervention in the Nigerian government.
35.0

Fig.1 b
Nigeria's Capital Expenditure and Oil Revenue (% of GDP)
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The period 1987 and I 998 witnessed considerable decline in capital
expenditure . Two factor were responsible for thi s trend. The first was the
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economic crisis that necessitated the introduction of the StructuraJ
Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986. The second was the deliberate strict
control over capital expenditure during the Abacha administration ( 19941998) . This was the longest burst in capital expenditure in Nigeria since
1970.
Data from 1996 showed an upturn and sharp increase in capital
expenditure. The effect of improved oi l revenue and the preparation for a
change to dem ocratic rul e were the dri ving forces. There was another
episode of capital expenditure boom , which continued up until 1999, before
another burst in 2000, when it fell to 4.8 per cent of GDP, the lowest in 16
years.
The large swings in capital expenditure arising from volatile export
product revenue have characterised all the WAMZ countries. Even th o ugh
the Lmderlying causes differ, the consequences are very similar with
obvious macroeconomic consequences. Typically, the dependence on
vo latile commodity revenue to finance capital expenditure beyond the
economy's absorpti ve capacity has resulted to unsustainable budget
deficits during the period of revenue burst. Thi s is beca use, once
committed, it is difficult to lower the level of capital expenditure from its
peak, in the face of declining revenue. In all the WAMZ member countries,
the empiricaJ fact of the politi cal economy is the downward stickiness of
recmrent and capital expenditure.
Beyond the above argument , government expenditure has to be
efficient and targeted towards productive ventures before it can impact
positively on the economy. This has not been the case for WAMZ countries.
In Nigeria, for in stance, an exan1ination of the classification of capital
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expenditure shows that the expenditure priority has been skewed tow ards
on-lending to parastatals and transfers, while a very small proporti on goes
to economic and social services as Figure 2, below shows. Often these
expenditure result in colossal waste. The net effect is the reducti on in
resources available for future public investment, social programmes and the
increase in additional deficits.

There are obvious political economy lessons to be learnt from the
boom and burst cycle of capital expenditure in the WAMZ. Prominent
among them is the need to address the effects of the distortions ari sing from
fi scal deficits on the economy. Critical areas of concern include inflation,
exchange rate stability, and external reserve loss. Volatility in cap ital
expenditure gives rise to abandonment of public projects durin g th e peri ods
of revenue burst. The non-execution of public projects generally gives the
false impression of corruption, which often tri gger governance probl ems.
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The impact of Fiscal Deficit on Key Macroeconomic Indicators

In order to propose remedial measures for addressing poor fiscal
management, we need to understand the linkages between fiscal dominance
and key macroeconomic variables, such as inflation, exchange rate, growth,
external reserves, and liquidity or money supply.
It is quite straightforward to relate government spending that is not
financed by tax or non-tax revenue to excess aggregate demand. For
instance, when government spending is financed by central bank, it
increases the monetary base, and thus the money supply. This is generally a
source of inflationary pressure in the economy. Inflation is therefore likely
when government spending is financed through money creation, not
matched by increased production of goods and services. The fa ilure to
adjust the fiscal positi on may give rise to expansionary monetary policy or
in the crowding out of the private sector.
When government increases its spending, without taxes or other
measw·es to restrain private sector demand, imports are liable to grow
relati ve to exports of goods and services, and the current account tends to
deteriorate. This relationship can be derived via the familiar national
income identity that
S-I=CAB .. ........ ... .. ... .. ............ ........ ......... .. .. .. ..... ...... .... ..... ..(1)
Where,
I = Gross Investment; S= Gross Nati onal savings; and CAB = Current
Account Balance Expressing ( I), the economy wide saving-investment
gap, in terms of the gaps of the private and government sector gaps, we get,
(Sp- Ip) + (Sg - lg)= X- M, where X and Mare exports and imports,
respectively. The government sector defi cit (revenue minus expenditure,
T-G) is equal to the savings-investment gap of government,
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(Sp-Ip)+ (T-G) =X-M or CAB .. .. ....... ............... .... .............. .(2)
Equation (2) shows that the external current account balance has the
counterpart of the sum of the private sector's saving-investmant gap and the
government deficit. Thus, any fiscal deficit must be matched by a domestic
private sector that saves more than it invest and/or by an external current
account deficit. When cunent account deficits result from fiscaJ expansion ,
it has to be financed either through foreign borrowing, investment by
foreigners in domestic stocks and bonds, or by drawing down international
reserves. Since the current levels of debt for most countries in WAMZ are
too high and the capital markets are undeveloped, the logical policy option is
to draw down the reserves to finance current account deficits. Thus, fi scaJ
dominance has a negative impact on inflation and external reserves. It is
worth noting at this point that the relationship between fiscal deficit and
current deficit may not be causal. The extent of the linkage depends on the
impact offiscal policy on private sector savings and investment beh avior.
The impact of fi scal dominance also depends on the economic
fundamental s. In countries with flexible exchange rate regime, like most
WAMZ countries, fi scal dominance affects and is affected by exchange
rate. In particular, fi scal dominance is likely to lead to exchange rate
depreciation even in the short run. Also, because imports increase w ith fi scal
expansion, the real exchange rate is likely to appreciate, making the
economy less competitive internationally.

In the short rw1, fiscal dominance may increase growth, especially
during a recession . However, capacity constrains, low responsiveness of
domestic supply, and the inability to contain an adverse balance of payment
position are likely to limit the positive effects of deficit financing in most
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countries, including WAMZ. It is therefore likely that fiscal dominance may
lead to distortions in the economy and ultimately to a reduction in output
brrowth. For instance, financial market participants may quickly raise
interest rates in response to expected higher rate of inflati on and the prospect
of monetary instability. Overall , to the extent that government is a major
source of disaving in the economy (that is, its consumption exceeds its
current revenue), fiscal dominance may have adverse impact on growth.
This is more likely if consumption is unrelated to the production of hum an
capital and/or maintenance of physical infrastructure.

Empirical Analysis
Using the vector error correction modeling (VECM) technique, we
estimated the impact of fiscal dominance on the key macroeconomic
variables, mentioned above, using Nigeria as a case study. Recall that a
vector error conection model (VECM) is a restricted vector autoregression.
(VAR), designed for use with non-stationary series that are known to be
cointegrated. It has cointegration relations built into the specification such
that the long-run behavior of the endogenous variables is restricted to
converge to their cointegrating relationships while allowing for short-rw1
adjustment dynamics. In this fran1ework, the deviation from long-run
equilibrium is conected gradually through a series of partial short-run
adj ustment.

In addition , the interpretation of the parameters of such model s has
limited economic significance, in most cases, as it may not conform to
theoretical expectations. However, the impul se responses derived from tl1e
VAR analyses have been found to be very useful in tracing the effect of one
standard deviation shock to one of the policy innovations on current and
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future values of the endogenous variables in the VAR. These effects in the
VECM are shown using the graphs produced by the impulse responses. The
x-axis of the graphs shows the response period, while the y-axis show the
respective Cholesky (degree of free_dom adjusted) one standard deviation
shocks due to fiscal dominance.

Major Findingsfromth.e VECM
The cointegration analyses revealed the presence of one
cointegrating equation followin g the maximum-eigen value test. The
impulse response graphs are presented below using data spanning the
period 1970 -2002. The results from the impulse responses are discussed
below.

Response ofI njlation and money supply to fiscal dominance
The change in the general price level was found to respond
instantaneously to a fiscal shock and the effect was persistent, particularly
in the short to medium term. This effect was also found to be positive and
very significant. The effect on money supply was even more significant as
fiscal shock tended to increase money supply. The impact was much more in
the medium term than in the short-term . This result confirms the fact that
fiscal dominance in the WAMZ is biased towards money creation and that
this mode of financing has inflationary consequences and could be the root
of high inflation episodes in the zone. Indeed, the analysis confim1s the
famous Milton Friedman 's statement that inflation is always and
everywhere a monetary phenomenon. Accordingly, rapid monetary growth
is inconceivable without fiscal dominance.

13
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Resp onse to Cholesky One S. D. Innovations in Fiscal Deficit of Key Macroeconomic Variables.
Response of External Reserves to Fiscal Deficit
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Response ofex.change rate and ex.ternal reserve to fiscal dominance
An increase in the nominal value of the exchange rate is regarded as
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depreciation. Our graph shows significant increase in the nominal exchange
rate, at least in the first two years following a fiscal shock. This is also in
confom1ity with the theoretical prediction. However, this effect tends to
taper off after the sixth period. Assuming there is no change in both
domestic and foreign prices, it is expected that the real exchange rate will
also appreciate during this period. By implication therefore import becomes
cheaper and hence the demand for imports increases and exerts pressure on
the current account, resulting in a deficit. This perhaps explains why the
impulse response graph for external reserve shows a sharp significant
decline in the medium term. It could also be infen-ed that fiscal shocks
affects the external reserve, negatively, and with a lag, long enough for the
real exchange rate to appreciate.

Response ofeconomic growth to fiscal dominance
The relationship of growth to fiscal dominance summaries a wellknow conclusion regarding the fact that high fiscal deficits inhibit growth,
which further worsens the fiscal stance. This is seen by the volatile pattern
exhibitelby the graph . Since fiscal deficits crowd out private investment,
potential output and growth are affected.
The significance of the results of this analysis can be appreciated
when it is considered that the major objectives of economic policy for
WAMZ in the short to medium term are to achieve high growth, low
inflation and a sustainable balance of payments. Our results tend to indicate
that these objectives may not be attainable in an environment of volatile
expenditure and fiscal dominance. There is therefore a compelling need for
fiscal stabilisation and structural reforms. It has the advantage of ensuring
macroeconomic stability by altering the level and composition of aggregate
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demand and checking the growth of monetary aggregates.
At the micro level it impacts on the efficiency of resource utilisation
in the economy, good governance and fiscal transparency. Accordingly, this
paper recommends the adoption ofa fiscal rule within a broader framework
of fiscal adjustment, by the WAMZ member states.
The above recommendation is also based on the experiences of other
resource based countries that have adopted this rule. Indonesia is a notable
example, which explains why her fiscal deficit has been stable over time
compared to Nigeria as the figure above shows.
4.

The Need for Fiscal Rule
l

The destabilising ,e.ffects of large revenue swings and pro-cycJical
fiscal policy with deficit ]?ias are cJear evidence of poor fiscal management
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in WAMZ. This situation calls for a fiscal nde in order to assist in ensuring
sustainable fiscal policy. A fiscal rule in the short run aims at stabilising
expenditure programmes. The first option under the short run fiscal rule is
to target a balanced budget using a permanent commodity price. Historical
data can be used to estimate this permanent price. The second option is to
target a constant primary deficit that excludes the commodity export. This is
defined as revenue from other sources (excluding export
product/commodity) minus expenditure. The expenditure in this case
excludes interest payments and direct commodity export-related
expenditure (cash calls in the case of oil). The objectives of a short run fiscal
rule are two fold. These are to ensure precautionary savings and a reduction
in expenditure volatility. Precautionary saving means that excess revenue
today is saved to make up for future shortfalls in revenue.
The establishment of a 'Stabilisation Fund' represents the best
method of implementing the fiscal rule and thus managing the uncertainty
associated with volatile commodity revenue. However, its implementation
requires an efficient institutional arrangement. There are two possibilities.
First, the ' Stabilisation Fund' can be set up within the central bank, where
the excess revenue can be kept and then expended when there is a slump in
revenue. The use of hedging instruments can also complement this strategy.
The second, is the establishment of an independent agency to manage the
excess revenue. In this arrangement, when prices are high (above a
predetermined threshold) for a specified period, the government transfer
excess proceeds to the inqependent agency/fund. When the prices are low,
the independent agency transfers funds directly to the various tiers of
government. If properly managed, we believe that the creation of a
stabilisation fund may not be inconsistent with fi scal federalism as current! y
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practiced in Nigeria.

If these rules are to be implemented with a big bang, large fiscal
adjustment will be required and how much is required will depend largely
on the economic objectives, like inflation, growth, and external balance, it is
intended to address. The adoption of a fiscal rule can lessen the
government's agony resulting from deviation of actual revenue from
budgeted revenue since there is no way of knowing whether the emergence
of terms oftrade shock would be permanent or transitory.
5.

Conclusion
Lessons of experience have shown that successive governmei1t in the
WAMZ countries be it military or elected democracy have short-term time
horizon. Consequently, they have the tendency of engaging in conspicuous
consumption-never caring to save for "the rainy day". The establishment of

a stabilisation Fund represents the anti-dote for revenue volatility and the
best strategy to ensure that the spending spree does not come to an abrupt
stop during the period ofrevenue burst.
The achievement of forced changes m efficiency in fiscal and
monetary policy implementation represents the utmost benefit, which the
WAMZ countries will gain if and when the WAMZ monetary union finally
crystallizes. Arising from this is a major concern about the lack of sustained
macroeconomic convergence. Available data indicated that in all member
cow1tries, huge fiscal deficits, arising from revenue volatility and sticky
expenditure represent the fundamental cause for divergence.
The major challenge is on how to achieve sustainability in fiscal
policy in the region. As a way forward the paper proposes the
implementation of a fiscal mle that will stabilize fiscal programmes as wel l
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as ameliorate the effects of fiscal shocks. While these proposals will go a
long way in promoting a strong fiscal position arid help reenforce the
credibility in monetary policy, it must be recognised that there are no
substitute to pn1dent fiscal policy. Nigeria's proposed Fiscal Responsibility
Bill is a step in the right direction. The key to macroeconomic convergence
in the WAMZ is predicated on efiminating the boom and burst cycles in
government fiscal operations.
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APPENDIX

The model assumes that random macroeconomic disturbances are
associated with shocks arising from fiscal dominance. The dynam ic impact
of these disturbance on the macroeconomic system is analysed usin g a
VECM. lt therefore treats the endogenous variables, budget deficit (BDG),
inflation (CPI), money supply (M2), exchange rate (ER), external reserves
(RES), and output growth (GDPR) as a function of the lagged values of all
of the endogenous variables in the system
The result from the VECM estimation is presented below.
Vector Error Correction Estimates
Date: 04/01 /03 Time: 16:34
Sample(adjusted): 1973 2002
Included observations: 30 after adjusting endpoints
Standard errors in () & t-statistic in[]
Cointegrating Eq: CointE q I
BDG(-1)

1.000000

LOG(ER(-1)

-91.72181
(20. 1692)
(-4.54762)

LOG(M2(-1)

44.18062
(27.2012)
(1.62422)

LOG(GDPR(-1 )

323.2787
(70.7383)
(4.57007)

LOG(RE~(-1)

-136.1149
(17.5912)
(-7.73768)

LOG(CP1 (-1)

179.0536
(47.4434)
(3.77405)

C

-3678.157

Error Correction: O(BDG)
CoinEq1

0.045271
(0.03480)
(1 .30077)

D(LOG(ER))
0.002362
(0.00176)
(1.34505)

D(LOG(M2))
R))

O(LOG(GDP D(LOG (RES)
)

O(LOG(CPI))

-0.001 526
(0.00070)
(-219158)

-0.001389
(0.00045)
(-3.08816)

0.000518
(0.00075)
(0.69471 )

0.000142
(0.00589)
(0.02417)
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D(BDG(-1))

-0.651455
(0.27454)
[-2.37287]

-0.012585
(0.01385)
[-0.90857]

0.003118
(0.00549)
I o.56785)

0.002591
(0.00355)
[ 0.73022)

0.035402
(0.04644)
[ 0.76228)

-0.000512
(0.00589)
[-0.08690]

D(BDG(-2))

-0.317734
(0.26782)
[-1 .18638]

-0.031072
(0.01351)
[-2.29960]

-0.006515
(0.00536)
[-1 .21635)

-0.003565
(0.00346)
[-1 .03011)

-0.002591
(0.04530)
[-0.05718)

-0.007162
(0.00574)
[-1.24703]

D(LOG(ER(-1)))

4.912540
(5.45805)
[ 0.90005]

0.270060
(0.27537)
[ 0.98073]

-0.108585
(0.10917)
[-0.99468)

-0.162693
(0.07053)
(-2.30671)

-0.909513
(0.92328)
[-0.98509)

0.135027
(0.11704)
[ 1.15370)

D(LOG(ER(-2)))

-0.509254
(4.61200)
[-0.11042)

0.120504
(0.23268)
[ 0.51789)

-0.100184
(0.09224)
[-1 .08608]

-0.072519
(0.05960)
[-1 .21681]

-0.274597
(0.78016)
[-0.35197)

0.094159
(0.09890)
[ 0.95210]

D(LOG(M2(-1)))

4.402618
(15.4621)
[ 0.28474]

0.384944
(0.78009)
[ 0.49346]

-0.013589
(0.30925)
[-0.04394)

-0.493411
(0.19980)
[-2.46947]

-2.028720
(2.61556)
[-0.77564]

0.763281
(0.33156)
[ 2.30211]

D(LOG(M2(-2)))

10.11899
(18.9463)
[ 0.53409)

-0.205362
(0.95587)
[-0.21484]

-0.720231
(0.37894)
[-1 .90064)

-0.683914
(0.24483)
[-2.79345]

-3.573253
(3.20494)
[-1 . 11492]

-0.063711
(0.40627)
[-0.15682)

D(LOG(GDPR(1))}

15.04999

0.516286

0.220291

0.134482

3.616879

0.015482

(17.1015)
[ 0.88004]

r o.598391

(0.86279)

(0.34204)
[ 0.64405)

(0.22099)

I o.608551

(2.89287)
[ 1.25027)

I 0.042221

11 .13935

-0.062890

0.289478

0.102591

1.879038

0.029664

(15.0440)
[ 0.74045]

(0.75899)
[-0.08286)

(0.30089)

I o.962071

(0.19440)
[ 0.52773)

(2.54483)
[ 0.73837)

(0.32259)
[ 0.09196]

D(LOG(RES(-1)))

1.535352
(3.31229)
[ 0.46353]

0.229356
(0. 16711)
[ 1.37249]

-0.088381
(0.06625)
[-1 .33408)

-0.092123
(0.04280)
(-2.15231]

-0.239004
(0.56030)
[-0.42656]

0.016714
(0.07103)
[ 0.23533]

D(LOG(RES(-2)))

-0.134995
(1 .68724)
[-0.08001)

0.305191
(0.08512)
[ 3.58527]

-0.043456
(0.03375)
(-1.28773)

-0.023000
(0.02180)
(-1.05491)

0.055004
(0.28541)
[ 0.19272]

0.002419
(0.03618)
[ 0.06686)

D(LOG(CPl(-1)))

-10.26525
(19.7036)
[-0.52098)

0.009859
(0.99407)
[ 0.00992]

0.735932
(0.39409)
[ 1.86743]

0.911141
(0.25461)
[ 3.57853)

5.584157
(3.33304)
[ 1.67539)

0.279312
(0.42251)
[ 0.66108)

D(LOG(CPl(-2)))

1.193740
(11 .8821)
[ 0.10047)

0.160288
(0.59947)
[ 0.26738]

-0.058337
(0.23765)
[-0.24547)

0.068329
(0.15354)
[ 0.44502)

-2.022621
(2.00997)
[-1 .00629)

-0.203564
(0.25479)
(-0.79894]

C

-3.724255
(4 .85693)
[-0.76679]

-0.138100
(0.24504)
[-0.56359)

0.346194
(0.0971 4)
[ 3.56378]

0.178274
(0.06276)
[ 2.84046)

1.041 944
(0.82159)
[ 1.26820]

-0.029279
(0.10415)
[-0.28113)

A-squared

0.458405

0.581 383

0.505286

0.642617

D(LOG(GDPR(2)))

01.597905

0.535630

(0.36671)
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Adj. R-squared
0.018360
Sum sq. resids
486.2026
S.E. equation
5.512501
F-statistic
1.041722
Log likelihood
-84.34958
AkaikeAIC
6.556638
Schwarz SC
7.210530
Mean dependent · -0.207889
S.D. dependent
5.563812
Determinant Residual
Covariance
Log Likelihood
Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted).
Akaike Information Criteria
Schwarz Criteria

0.241256
1.237555
0.278114
1.709312
5.252736
0.583151
1.237043
0.173678
0.319282
4 .91E-08
53.60596
-2.968821
6.197921
10.401551

0.271202
0.194496
0.110254
1.830120
33.00993
-1 .267328
-0.613436
0.242269
0.129149

0.158329
0.081188
0.071234
1.419635
46.11467
-2.140978
-1 .487086
0.021026
0.077645

0.103330
13.91262
0.932491
1.257069
-31 .04214
3.002809
3.656701
0.282759
0.984755

0.352243
0.223561
0.118206
2.213066
30.92085
-1.128057
-0.474164
0.197428
0. 146870

